Perspectives - Vol. 5, No. 1 - William Bostock's 'Disturbed Mental States': A ResponseTed Cichon BA (Hons), RN (Psych.), Postgraduate Student, School of Government, University of Tasmania Updated: Feb 1st 2000 The title of Dr Bostock's paper (Perspectives Vol. 4 No. 4, November-December 1999) has some ambiguity. Although a mental state does not necessarily equate to behavior, it is possible to witness a 'demented' mental state, which can include paranoid characteristics, which can be a manifestation of brain dysfunction or degeneration. Some literature will label Hitler as being paranoid or even demented, yet scholars such as Goldhagen1 argues that the German people 'were impregnated with hatred' of the Jews long before 1939. Moreover, Caplan notes Polish anti-Semitism before the outbreak of World War II.2 Whether Danilo Kis's notion of 'identified nationalism as a state of collective and individual paranoias'3 can be paralleled with the Polish experience, leaves open a debate as to whether the Polish experience was nationalistically driven. But at the same time, it does not fulfill the criteria of an ideology as being one of anti-Semitism. However, in the instance above, a telling sentiment may be found in the expression: Jak jest bieda, to icz do Zyda.4 (when there is poverty, then go to a Jew). The inference here is that if all fails, a Jew will provide finance or goods, but at a price. Therefore, it follows the emotion of individual and collective jealousy may be the prominent feature here ,rather than an ideology. Bostock employs numerous terminological concepts for a subject that justifies more detailed discussion. This is not to say that Bostock's article excludes the wide range of phenomena witnessed in both individual, and collective behavior. But, in the instance where he cites collective mentality, some attention may have been given to say, the 1968 student demonstrations which swept the Western world, and in particular those in France. In a sense, this instance prompts the question: whether student unrest of the time was a manifestation of a mental state, or a legitimate cause for complaint. Certainly, elements of ideological fervor may have been present at that time, but the students' grievances need to be taken into account. Thus, while Durkheim's concept of collective consciousness may differ from the individual consciousness, the Paris students' experience of 1968, may well counter the argument. In other words, individual grievances in essence did not differ from those of a collective voice or by the manifestation of protest or collective behavior. I concur with Bostock in questioning the notion of whether we can term certain behaviors as being either 'bad or mad'. It is argued here that political analysts and clinicians alike remain ill equipped to make empirical conclusions. For instance, while on the one hand, publications such as Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders provide a comprehensive analysis, descriptively and diagnostically, no such study can ever account for variations from the medical or psychiatric model, on which it relies upon for its reason d'ętre. Certainly, it is useful to consider Hitler's medical history, which included a degree of psychosomatic phenomena, and then later a noticeable manifestation of Parkinson's Disease, to name but few. But the point is, so frequently diagnosticians fall into the trap of false categorization. Perhaps, the actions of Martin Bryant, the Tasmanian gunman who in 1996 randomly killed 35, persons demonstrate this. The subsequent legal process could not identify a mental condition to explain his massacre of 35 innocent people at Port Arthur. In brief, the author here argues the case for a mathematical configuration to explain the complexities of both individual and collective behavior. In other words, the permutations and combinations are almost endless. Returning to Bostock's earlier citation of 'the cause of human catastrophe', where Freud examined the causes of war, and recognized the existence of the death wish as a pessimistic conclusion that 'war cannot be abolished because of the great differences between nations', leaves the door open to further debate. Desertion in war time may be viewed on the one hand as a pacifistic protest, but on the other hand, it can be viewed as an action for survival. However, it can be argued that the collective action of the 900 or so people who partook in the collective action of suicide by cyanide ingestion in Jonestown was neither bad nor mad in the context of free choice. Nevertheless, this opens the debate as to whether it was free choice to confront, or even accept mortality in the purist sense, or a matter of brainwashing/indoctrination. But perhaps, Jones's brethren were persuaded to commit suicide because they believed in the notion of salvation. Is this then an ideology, or some sinister manipulation of a vulnerable collective psyche? To answer this question, a further study in cults and religious fundamentalism may be useful. Moreover, Bostock identifies the problem of the constraints of the usage of non-medical terminology in the analysis of collective behavior, such as genocide. At the same time, 'by way of contrast medical terminology is being used more and more frequently in the description and analysis of these activities'. However, the author here is concerned with the notion of a collective diagnosis when applied to activities such as genocide or war. The point is, as we enter the new millennium, humanity continues to intellectualize, and therefore rationalize war in term of a 'just cause'', or jus bello. Yet, contemporary discourse persists to infer the above, particularly the activity of genocide, as a collective psychosis. Thus, in the context of Bostock's study, it can be argued that evil is also a clinical manifestation, as well as political. This in turn would demand the same prescriptions for treatment as those employed in the medical model. But again, this prompts the question in both instances, whether such a condition (evil or psychosis) lies dormant awaiting for the circumstances for it to become either an individual or a collective human catastrophe. In any case, it is suggested here, the behavior which Bostock attempts to succinctly outline, leads to what I term as a theoretical tension in such discourse. To sum up, Bostock's study acutely illuminates the parallels which exist between the individual and the collective state. Therefore, it can be argued here, politicians , governments and NGOs, to name but few, could borrow the same prescriptions of treatment as those used in the medical model. In a word, we can term it prevention, rather than intervention. To use the above analogy further, the human body becomes sick if it is not properly nourished. Similarly, a society displays not only maladjustment when certain conditions prevail, but rather, a collective malaise when it is denied proper measures of socio-economic policies, constructive international relations, aid, and an understanding of its cultural background. However, as argued above, there is no definitive prescription here because, collective behavior also has an array of permutations and combinations, which vary from culture to culture, from nation to nation. Notes 1. Goldhagen, D.J., Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, (London: Abacus, 1996). See also, Rosenbaum, R., Explaining Hitler: The Search for the Origins of His Evil, (New York : Random House, 1999). 2. Caplan, S., cited in Why Germany? : National Socialist Anti-Semitism and the European Context, Milfull, J., (ed.) ( London: Berg Publishers Inc, 1993), pp. 221-225. 3. Kis, D., "On Nationalism" in Performing Arts Journal, 53 (18.2), 1996, pp. 13- 16. http://muse.jhu.edu/demo/perfoming_arts_journal/18.2kis.html. Sighted December 22, 1999. 4. It should be noted however, not all Polish Jews were entrepreneurs, nor wealthy. Nevertheless, there existed an unofficial campaign in pre-war Poland known as Nie kupój u Zyda (Do not buy from a Jew). Moreover, another sentiment of economic disenchantment is found in the expression: Zydzi maja kamienice, a Polacy ulice (The Jews own the buildings, whereas the Poles own the streets). The implicit interpretation here is that the Jews owned the means of production, be they for instance, commercial properties, financial institutions and so on. The Poles were left with streets, which had no productive force. By 1938, there existed a policy of Towarzystwo jednolitych cen, which meant a policy of fixed or uniform prices for goods. As the prospect of war loomed, the Jewish community began making contributions to the Polish defense program. Please note, in Polish phonetics the letter 'Z' in this case would be with a dot.
Reference
Cichon, Ted (2000). William Bostock's 'Disturbed Mental States': A Response. [Online]. Perspectives. [2000, February 1]. |
